Piecework

This past week's two beig Middle East developments drew mixed reviews. They also made the Bush administration look like a marginal player in Middle East affairs and its policies toward Lebanon, Hezbollah, Syria, Hamas, Israel and Iran like miserable failures. The agreement that key Lebanese political players signed in Doha, Qatar was a victory primarily for Hezbollah and secondarily for Arab League diplomacy. The agreement resolves for now the political crisis in Lebanon: It commits the parties to a National Unity government in which Hezbollah will have veto power; it agrees to the election of the compromise presidential candidate Gen. Michel Suleiman and calls for certain revisions of the electoral laws that will increase Shiite representation in the Lebanese parliament. These changes correspond to the probable populations of the respective communities and certainly to their respective military strengths, as Hezbollah's recent armed seizure of West Beirut bluntly demonstrated. Through the agreement the government parties averted a coup d'état or civil war, which would have cost them more. The agreement, however, does not address the wider issue of Hezbollah's future character, viz., political party, movement, army; it does not quiet fears in Lebanon of Hezbollah creating a state within a state.

The agreement generally received regional and international applause. Even the United States, which had called upon Lebanon's government to stand up to Hezbollah expressed some satisfaction. Its spin was that Hezbollah's gains, achieved at gunpoint, had cost it its reputation and so political partners among other Lebanese Some skeptics, however, questioned whether the agreement just delayed the collapse of Lebanon into civil or could really defuse the situation. Yet the Arab patrons of the parties -- primarily the Saudis, on one side, Syria, on the other apparently signed off on the agreement. That suggests they have interests in making the agreement work or, put another way, keeping Lebanon from becoming the battleground of a proxy war between the United States and Iran. If so, the politics of the regional system have trumped those of the global system (not that Iran is really a global player). Since the regional politics are traditionally contentious and solidarity weak, the agreement testifies to the extent of the Arab states' disdain for the United States and suspicions of Iran.

Official Israel and Syrian statements that the two countries are indirectly negotiating peace through the Turkish foreign ministry are no surprise since reports of such negotiations have been leaking for the past month. The statements, however, made the countries' respective patrons, the US and Iran, look ineffective, since each had publicly warned its client against such negotiations. Indeed, a New York Times editorial rather imaginatively argued that George Bush's condemnation of appeasers in his May 14 speech to the Knesset was aimed at both Obama and Israelis who want to negotiate with groups to whom the Administration refuses to speak, viz., Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah. Secretary of State Rice said rather coolly that it was okay for Israel to negotiate with Syria. She then claimed that Israel and the Palestinian Authority were making such progress in their US sponsored negotiations that agreements could be signed by the end of the year. Since neither the parties to these negotiations nor any informed observers believe this, Rice is either terribly out of touch or just plain lying. Given her record, it's hard to tell.

Iranian president Ahmadinejad and his circle were reportedly pissed off by the revelation to the point of branding Syria's negotiations a betrayal of its friendship with Iran. Iran's foreign ministry, however, denied the truth of such reports. So Ahmadinejad is likely to soft pedal his opposition while working behind the scenes to block the negotiations.

There is considerable doubt among Israelis that the negotiations can succeed, though arguably both sides can benefit if Israel gives Syria the entire Golan Heights in return for a peace that includes an end of Syria's alliances with Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran. For one thing, earlier negotiations between Syria and Israel failed because the two sides could not agree on the extent and modality of Syria's control of the Golan. Second, Israel PM Olmet is too weak politically to get the Israel public behind such a deal. Indeed many skeptics believe he chose to disclose the negotiations now to deflect attention from a police investigation of his possibly corrupt practices when he was Minister of Industry and Commerce in a previous government. Third, although Israeli governments have tended to look at negotiations as an alternative to negotiations with the Palestinians, the Israel will need some assurance that some peace can be reached with the Palestinians before it will agree to relinquishing all or most of the Golan.

On the Brink or in the Bazaar

Reuters and al-Jazeera report that talks in Doha, Qatar among Lebanese leaders have fasiled to reach any agreement for ending the political crisis in Lebanon. According to al-Jazeera one major disagreement is over proposals concerning the size of electoral districts, particularly in Beirut, with Christians fearing that large sized districts would dilute their representation in Parliament. According to Reuters, the sticking point is Hezbollah's refusal to a compromise proposed by the Qatari hosts that would give Hezbollah 10 ministers in the government cabinet and some say over the appointment of a n eleventh. This would give it close to, but not guaranteed, veto power in the government.

The compromise proposal evidences Hezbollah's strength and indicates how out of touch with reality is the Bush administration in thinking, as Bush's Security Adviser Stephen Hadley puts it, the talks are an opportunity for the Lebanese government to clip Hezbollah's wings.

Articles in Le Monde and The New York Times highlight the threat of radicalization among Lebanese Sunni, who feel humiliated by thrashing Hezbollah gave the Sunni militia and institutions in Beirut. Their attention has increasingly turned to hardline and even Salafists preachers who have denounced Hezbollah and Shiites in general as enemies. Fighting along sectarian lines broke out in Tripoli last week. Although the main players are different, this type of polarization has reminded many Lebanese of the situation before the outbreak of the civil war in the 1970s.

Of further interest regarding Lebanon: New York Times columnist David Brooks reports speaking to Barack Obama about Lebanon, among other flash points in the Middle East, and being impressed by the candidate's knowledge and policy sense. Obama clarified to Brooks's satisfaction that he did not consider Hezbollah just a political party and that he would strengthen the Lebanese state as a provider of services to its citizens in order to peel away Lebanese Shiite support for Hezbollah. Obama would not rule out any talking with Hezbollah, because tough strategies work best when coupled to diplomacy, but he would not talk unconditionally with Hezbollah, Hamas or Iran. Brooks concluded that Obama is a realist regarding the Middle East. That's quite a good thing for Brooks and other moderate conservatives.

Lebanon Update

A tense quiet has settled in Lebanon. The Lebanese army took up positions in West Beirut that were vacated by Hezbollah gunmen and the streets have emptied of armed fighters. Army commanders declared they would suppress by force, if necessary, armed or other paramilitary activities by the various parties and factions. Supporters of the government have expressed some satisfaction with this outcome, although they were disappointed by the army's failure to intervene over the weekend. While some have explained the army could not for fear of spllitting the soldiers and officers along communal lines, others, like Christian far right winger Samir Gagea, questioned keeping the army intact at the price of letting the country fall apart. In any case, the army is ill equipped and untrained to quell factional fighting or less violent demonstrations, so it will be unlikely to intervene effectively, even should the commanders want that. So the main effect of the declarations is to give the various sides an excuse to take a break (or more hopefully step back from the brink), before the next flash point comes up. That will be next month, when the Lebanese government, having today passed on voting for a new president, is now scheduled to meet for that purpose.

An op-ed piece in Le Monde calls Hezbollah's actions a coup d'état. Actually they were more a rehearsal for one. Political scientists and schemers know that the neutrality of a country's army is vital for the success of a coup d'état. Hezbollah now knows (or believes) it can count on that if and when it goes for the real thing.

Hezbollah appears the winner in the ongoing test of strength in Lebanon. The Lebanese government turned over to the army the decisions on shutting down Hezbollah's private telelphone network and the firing of the airport security chief, who had allowed Hezbollah to install its own security cameras. The army, still headed by the Michel Suleiman, the compromise candidate for Lebanese president, then revoked the government's decisions. Hezbollah, in return, withdrew its fighters from West Beirut, but continues to demand a government in which Shiites will have one third of the cabinet seats and hence veto power. Its fighter will also continue to carry weapons openly.

These moves have quieted Beirut, but fighting between government supporters and the opposition broke out on Saturday in Tripoli and on Sunday in mountain villages southeast of Beirut, a mainly Druze area. Druze leader and government supporter Walid Jumblatt called on his rival and opposition supporter Talal Arslan to stop the fighting and submit to army control. As this fighting demonstrates, the alignment of forces is not entirely along communal lines. While the Shiite parties, viz., Hezbollah and Amal, are in the opposition and the Sunni generally support the government, the Druze and Christians are split, mainly as a consequence of factions within these communities trying to increase their respective power and resources through opportunistic alliances. The fragmentation is far from that during the civil war, when militias were ubiquitous and rivalries played down to the street and family level. But it might be heading there.

The Arab League has dispatched an emergency mediation team to Beirut. It will meet with Hezbollah chairman Nasrallah and Sunni leader Sa'ad Hariri, in the hopes of getting their agreement to the long-delayed appointment of a new Lebanese president, a principal part of any exit strategy from the crisis. Lebanese PM Fuad Siniora in the meantime, according to the Israel press, bitterly criticized Hezbollah, saying "not even the enemy Israel dared do to Beirut what Hezbollah has done" [armed occupation and shutting access to the airport]. The rhetoric is especially provocative, because the rationalization in Lebanon for Hezbollah maintaining a heavily armed militia is its being the de facto resistance to any Israel incursions.

Hezbollah's convincing show of strength moves the regional balance of power toward its partron Iran. Iran also scored a symbolic success in Iraq this week, when it again brokered a face-saving truce for the Al-Maliki government in its indecisive struggle against the Mehdi army in Sadr city. These gains increase the unlikely prospects for diplomatic-political efforts to reduce Iranian influence, say, detaching Syria from its alliance with Iran or promoting a tacit alliance between Israel and Sunni Arab states . So Israel leaders will see little purpose in discussing peace with Syria at this time or speeding up peace negotiations with the Palestinians. Instead, feeling bracketed by Iranian clients, they are more likely to seek coordination with the Bush administration on some intervention in Lebanon or even confrontation with Iran.

A Gathering Storm?

Yesterday's commemorations of Israel's independence and the Palestinians' nakba (catastrophe) are already overshadowed by crises in Israel and Lebanon. Israel PM Olmert is under another police investigation, his third in recent years, concerning new charges of bribe taking (in incidents uncovered during the course of an earlier investigation). He is liable to be indicted, in which case, he says, he will resign. That possibility raises the question of his succession by Foreign Minister Livni and her ability to keep a governing coalition, on one hand, or early elections, on another. Olmert and his supporters claim the charges are trumped up by opponents to peace talks the Palestinians or Syria, that, he says, are making progress. So far Olmert has not given any evidence for this claim. Moreover, to judge by the government's record and the current state of the talks, the opponents would need no help from the police to derail they. They can just leave that to Olmert, his coalition partners and the Israel army, all of whom appear quite capable and willing to do that themselves.

In Lebanon, Chairman Nasrallah declared war on the Lebanese government after, he says, the Lebanese government declared war on Hezbollah, by trying to shut down the private communications network that Hezbollah had set up throughout Lebanon, with Iranian help. Hezballah gunmen have blocked the road from Beirut's international airport to the city and also wrested control of West Beirut from Sunnis. These moves come after months of a political stalemate over choosing a Lebanese president, that has pitted Sunni, Druse and most Christian communities in Lebanon against Lebanese Shiites, dominated by Hezbollah. The political situation is aggravated by economic deterioration in Lebanon, due to several factors: a) the devastation from the war with Israel two years ago; b) the political stalemate itself scaring off foreign investment; and c) rising costs of food and other necessities which has provoked violent demonstrations.

In addition, Hezbollah military leaders want to show their muscles, because the party has failed to strongarm its candidate into the presidency of Lebanon, while the Sunni, Druse and Christians grouped in the anti-Syria, anti-Shia coalition would rather have a showdown now rather than later when Hezballah is even stronger. So the parties are likely to spiral into a civil war. In that case, Israel leaders, with or without Olmert at their helm, will decide to "help" the Lebanese government either overtly or clandestinely. The Bush administration would undoubtedly green light any such Israeli move, since it regards conflicts involving Iranian clients -- Sadrists in Iraq, Hamas, Hezballah -- as proxy wars with Iran. Iranian leaders have a corresponding view of conflict directed at US clients, viz., Israel, the Lebanese government, the Arab gulf states. Lebanon today is an opportunity for them to demonstrate Lebanon's disruptive power and consequently its being a necessary player in achieving some stabilities in the Middle East, regardless of Western efforts to isolate it over the nuclear program issue.

International relations in the Middle East are like the old joke about in New England. If you don't like what is happening now, just wait a bit.

Nation Building

Iraq is a great place to practice nation-building, especially for an administration whose head wanted no part of it and whose skill set is consistent with that desire. That was clear from the testimonies today by David Petraeus and Ryan Crocker to the Senate Armed Forces and Foreign Relations Committee. Despite their efforts to simplify and talk up a complex, dismal situation, the complexities and fluidities in the Iraqi political landscape were evident from their words. So was their inability to see beyond a very narrow scope and the utter lack of visibility of what happens next. This is not surprising: there are numerous layers of regional, ethnic, linguistic, religious, tribal, economic and political faults in Iraq and very little shared tradition of living in a unified state. Ambassador Ryan's citing as a major accomplishment the creation of a new Iraqi flag and its being flown in all parts of Iraq --next to the Kurdish flag in the north -- was pathetic, but maybe that is all that can be expected. Crocker nearly referenced arguably the best model for understanding the politics and violence of current Iraq, when he projected the Lebanonization of Iraq in the event of US withdrawal. But not the Lebanon of today, to which Crocker indeed referred, casting the Mehdi Army in role of Hezbollah and Iran in the role of Iran and Syria. Rather the Lebanon of nearly 35 years ago, at the beginning of the civil war. Some features are different, to be sure, but there are similar fragmentations of power, corruption as standard government practice and militias doubling as political agents and extortionist gangs.

Lebanon's civil war lasted fifteen years, 1975 - 1990, and involved occupations of Lebanese territory by two neighboring powers, Syria and Israel, thirty and eighteen years, respectively, which outlasted the war itself. The US occupation was much shorter but costly. Recall the Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut. The civil war and the interventions killed at least 100,000 Lebanese residents, permanently injured another 100,000 and caused over 250,000 to emigrate, out of population of about 5 million, including the Palestinians. The civil war was not continuous fighting but broken into phases, separated by attempts at political reconciliation and the suppression of some violence by the occupying troops in league with one or more of the political factions. If Lebanon is the model, even if Iraq has already had five years of civil unrest or war, the end is still far off. To measure progress over months rather than years is foolhardy, to predict victory -- whatever that means and for whom -- is insane.

Not Yet Time for War

Last week brought a bit more than the usual tensions in dealings between Israel and its neighbors to the north, Lebanon, Hezbollah and Syria. On Wednesday, the inner Israel cabinet that deals with security announced for this coming week a large, unprecedented exercise to test military and civilian readiness for an attack on the homeland. Another announcement said gas masks would be distribute to Israel households in the near future for protection against possible chemical missile attacks. These announcement and the actions are partly taken in response to renewed threats by Hezbollah Secretary Nasrallah to avenge the killing, presumably by Israel operatives, of his military commandeer Imad Mughniyeh in February in Dasmascus. Since Israel PM Olmert has already warned that Israel will punish Syria and Lebanon as well as Hezbollah for any such act, the security cabinet seems to have deemed likely a new, rapidly escalating edition of the Second (2006) Lebanon war, triggered by a high profile Hezbollah action. Perhaps a suicide bombing during Passover or next month's celebrations of Israel's 60th anniversay. The estimate might have been raised by a report, later discredited, of an unusual mobilizations in the Syrian army, as if Syria knew from its client Hezbollah that the trigger was going to be pulled.

The Lebanese government was understandably nervous and somewhat dubious that Israel would await provocation to go after Hezbollah. It is still beset by the stalemate over choosing a new President and unable to curb Hezbollah. Prime Minister Siniora expressed his fear of an Israel attack to the UN, US and world opinion. The situation in Syria, once the troop movement report was discounted, appeared calmer to Israelis. Nevertheless, Israel signaled that the combined military-civilian exercise was no prelude to an attack on Syria or anyone else. By week's end the tensions had subsided and Syrian President Assad even allowed that peace with Israel was an imaginable strategy for his country's security. That was consistent with the reendorsement at the Arab League meeting just concluded in Damascus of the Saudi 2002 proposal of peace, once Israel withdrew to the 1967 boundaries. In the meantime, attention in Israel began shifting to another aspect of its complex relationship with Syria: the prospect of fuller disclosure later this month about the Israel Air Force's bombing of some installation in northern Syria, last September. The rumor is the Bush administration will publicize material provided by Israel that confirms the installation was technology purchased from North Korea for purposes of nuclear weapons development.

According to Zvi Barel in Haaretz, the Israel government feared Syria might miscalculate Israel's intentions and drag both sides into a war that neither wants at this time. However, since the relationship between the two states is based on deterrence, arguably any step one side takes to reduce its vulnerability can be read by the other side as aggressive and encourage the other side to preempt before the vulnerability is reduced. On the other hand, if no effort is made to reduce the vulnerability, the other side may also be tempted to attack. So absent MAD capabilities and the will to use them, deterrence is likely to be a fumbling, unstable relationship. No wonder the Second Lebanon War left Israeli strategists brooding about Israel having lost its deterrence strength and what it must do to regain it. But, Barel notes, the brooding might be a waste of time, since both Israel in 2006 and Syria in 1973 showed they can start wars without considering their costs. He suggests the real problem instead is the strategists do not see much benefit in peace with Syria in its present condition. Neutralizing Syria would diminish, but not eliminate the threats from Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran. They would prefer peace only after certain conditions have been met: repudiation of Hamas and Hezbollah, a break with Iran, an isolated Syria without any strategic capabilities. In other words, peace would be reward for Syria rather than an opportunity for Israel vis a vis the Middle East and for Syria vis a vis the West.